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N RECENT DECADES, immigration to the United States has
reached historic proportions. Many observers liken this large
and sustained wave of immigration to the Great Migration at the
beginning of the 20th century.
1 Certainly the promise of America
is the same—a land of opportunity and freedom. The number
of immigrants today is also similar to that at the turn of the cen-
tury. Natives’ concerns regarding the skill composition and ethnic
makeup of the immigrant flow are likewise a familiar tune.
Many things are also different, however. Immigration policy today
is restrictive and complex. Illegal immigration is commonplace. The
types of jobs immigrants fill have also changed, with service sector
jobs largely replacing jobs in manufacturing. The fiscal impact of im-
migration is far more significant today than a hundred years ago.
The economic and policy implications of this Second Great Migra-
tion are far-reaching. In this article, we touch on the most important
components of the immigration debate. We first discuss the number
and composition of immigrants and the forces attracting them to the
United States. Next, we analyze the economic performance of immi-
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pact of immigration on natives. Finally,
we describe current policy and discuss
some options for policy reform.
Number and Composition of
Immigrants: Who’s Coming and Why?
The current immigration wave is the
largest in U.S. history. The number of
legal immigrants admitted in the decade
1991–2000 is estimated at more than 9
million, exceeding the previous record
of 8.8 million set nine decades earlier
during the First Great Migration (Chart
1). In addition, net illegal immigration
is estimated to be 2.8 million during this
decade. The nation’s number of foreign-
born residents is also at an all-time
high, over 25 million. As a share of the
population, however, foreign-born resi-
dents are only about 10 percent. This is
up from 5 percent in 1970 but below
the 15 percent peak reached during the
First Great Migration.
Immigrants increase both the popu-
lation and the labor force. During the
last two decades, immigration has sup-
plied at least one quarter of the nation’s
labor force growth. For fast-growing
states such as Texas, the impact has
been much larger. International immi-
gration to Texas in the 1990s surpassed
domestic in-migration as a contributor
to population growth in six of nine
years (Chart 2).
Dramatic shifts have occurred in
both the national origins and the skill 
levels of recent immigrants. Latin Amer-
ica and Asia have replaced Europe and
Canada as primary sending areas (Chart
3), much as Southern and Central Europe
replaced Western and Northern Europe
during the First Great Migration. The
skill levels of immigrants have also
changed. Since the late 1960s, immi-
grants have been much more likely to
be at the low end of the native educa-
tion distribution compared with immi-
grants in the early post–World War II 
period. For example, a disproportionate
number of recent immigrants lack high
school diplomas. While the number of
natives without a diploma has dropped
sharply during the last few decades, the
decline among immigrants has been
much less rapid (Chart 4).
Although much attention has been
devoted to this rise in low-skilled immi-
gration, it is important to note that the
United States continues to attract high-
skilled immigrants as well. In fact, the
United States attracts labor dispropor-
tionately from both extremes of the skill
spectrum. Immigrants are more likely to
be high school dropouts, but they are
also disproportionately likely to have 
at least master’s degrees—12.5 percent
compared with 10 percent for natives.
Market forces draw both low-skilled
and high-skilled labor to the United
States. Low-skilled workers come be-
cause such labor is relatively scarce
here. This scarcity implies that low-
skilled workers’ wages are relatively
high compared with those in develop-
ing countries where such labor is plen-
tiful and cheap. The attraction of high-
skilled workers to the United States
arises from demand as well as supply
factors. Demand for these workers is
strong because many of the industries
that require high-skilled workers are 
located in the United States. The higher
wages, combined with a favorable tax
climate (relative to Europe and Canada),
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depends not only on which foreigners
want to enter the United States but also
on which are legally allowed to do so,
a subject considered later in this article. 
Economic Performance and 
Contribution of Immigrants
Two distinct issues arise in economic
analysis of immigration policy. The first is
the immigrants’ economic performance,
which looks at their well-being in the
U.S. economy. The second is immigrants’
impact on the well-being of natives. As
discussed below, these two issues turn
on somewhat different considerations.
How Do Immigrants Fare in the
U.S. Economy? The shift in immigrant
origins to Latin America and Asia and
the higher proportion of immigrants
with low education levels have been ac-
companied by a decline in immigrants’
earnings levels relative to natives’. Earn-
ings capacity is correlated with country
of origin (Chart 5). While European 
immigrants earn higher average wages
than natives, Mexican immigrants have
average wages 40 percent below those
of natives.
As less-skilled workers have become
a larger portion of immigrant flows, re-
cent immigrants (defined as arriving in
the five years prior to each census sur-
vey date) have been doing progres-
sively worse relative to natives. In 1998
a recent male immigrant could expect
to earn one-third less than a male native
worker (Chart 6 ). In 1960, this dif-
ference was only 12 percent. The de-
terioration in immigrants’ earnings has
placed more of them at the bottom of
the native wage distribution. In 1998, 23
percent of immigrants had wages that
placed them in the bottom tenth of 
the native wage distribution, compared
with only 7 percent in 1960.
2 The wage
differences reflect that the majority of
recent immigrants are young, have
lower education levels and little work
experience, and speak limited English.
The aggregate statistics are discour-
aging. For an individual immigrant, how-
ever, the large initial wage disparity
does not persist over time. The earnings
difference between natives and immi-
grants falls as the immigrant remains in
the United States and assimilates. Most
studies find that immigrants experience
faster wage growth than natives, al-
though they do not, on average, reach
wage parity with natives. When com-
pared with similar natives, however—
by statistically controlling for education
and English fluency—immigrants reach
wage parity after 16 to 20 years in the
United States, according to one study.
3
As mentioned above, the economic
performance of immigrants does not
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1997), p. 191.determine their effect on the well-being
of natives. The contribution of immi-
grants is determined by how their pres-
ence in the labor market changes wages
and prices and to what extent these
changes affect native workers, employers
and consumers. Another way in which
immigrants affect natives in the modern
welfare state is through their impact on
public spending and, hence, taxes.
What Are Immigration’s Effects
on Native Workers and Consumers?
In general, the effects of immigration on
economic output and well-being are
analogous to the effects of trade. With
immigration, as with trade, gains accrue
when resources can be more efficiently
allocated. This “specialization” raises the
productivity of inputs and increases out-
put. By taking jobs for which they are
better suited, immigrants free up natives,
allowing them to flow into more spe-
cialized production. Gains also arise as
consumption is shifted toward goods
whose costs have consequently fallen.
A reasonable calculation of the increase
in the value of U.S. output (GDP) due
to immigration puts the number at
about $14 billion per year in 1997.
4
Gains from immigration arise when
immigrants differ from natives, just as
gains from international trade arise when
countries differ from each other. The more
different immigrants are, regardless of
whether they have lower or higher
skills than natives, the bigger the eco-
nomic gains.
This reasoning also implies that the
gains from immigration are not distrib-
uted evenly—there are winners and
losers. The losers are the natives who
are similar to immigrants and have to
compete with them in the labor market.
The winners are the natives who are
complementary to immigrants and be-
come more productive. In the case of
low-skilled immigration, the skilled na-
tives see their wages rise. Other win-
ners include employers of immigrants,
who pay lower wages; consumers, who
pay lower prices; and suppliers of
goods and services to immigrants, who
have more customers.
The last two effects are easily
demonstrated. Consumers benefit di-
rectly from immigration if they consume
goods and services produced by immi-
grants. For example, the large number
of low-skilled immigrants in Texas has
lowered prices for labor-intensive goods
and services such as baby-sitting, house-
keeping and gardening. These prices
range from 17 percent to 24 percent
below the national average.
5 Another 
effect of immigration is an increase in
the demand for existing commodities
such as real estate. The revival of many
inner-city neighborhoods is due to the
growth of immigrant enclaves, the in-
crease in immigrant-run businesses and
greater demand for housing. This has
had a positive effect on property values.
Fiscal Impact: How Does
Immigration Affect Taxpayers?
During the First Great Migration,
there were few publicly provided ser-
vices, so even low-skilled immigrants
had little fiscal impact. Today, however,
taxpayers fund an array of transfer pro-
grams as well as public education. To
fully evaluate the economic effects of
immigration, it is necessary to include
impacts on taxpayers.
Some studies calculate the fiscal im-
pact of immigrants on an annual basis.
However, a National Research Council
study adopts a more meaningful ap-
proach. The study computes the life-
time fiscal impact of immigrants and
their descendants—their expected tax
payments minus the expected cost of
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University Press, 1999), p. 27.the public services provided to them.
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Public services include (but are not lim-
ited to) welfare, Social Security, Medic-
aid and Medicare, as well as public
schools, police, fire protection and pub-
lic health services. The study estimates
that tax payments exceed the cost of
services by $80,000 for the average im-
migrant and his or her descendants
(Chart 7 ).
7 The cost of services slightly
exceeds taxes paid by the original im-
migrant, but the contributions of the im-
migrant’s descendants more than make
up the difference.
The average fiscal impact of immi-
grants (like that of natives) varies by 
education level. Immigrants with a high
school degree or better and their de-
scendants contribute more in taxes than
they use in public services, which pro-
duces the overall positive impact men-
tioned above. The average fiscal impact
of an immigrant with less than a high
school education, however, is minus
$13,000. The impact of the original im-
migrant is minus $89,000, largely offset
by the positive $76,000 in contributions
by the immigrant’s descendants.
Are Immigrants More Likely to
Use Public Assistance? The negative
fiscal impact of immigrants is felt largely
at the state and local level. Taxpayers
located near clusters of immigrants with
limited skills and education bear addi-
tional tax burdens. The increased bur-
den is due to immigrants’ higher usage
of schools and transfer programs. Al-
though attention has recently shifted to
the burden on schools, a disproportion-
ate amount of literature has focused on
immigrants’ use of welfare. It is true that
immigrants are more likely to partici-
pate in public assistance programs—
defined as Medicaid, Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (now Tem-
porary Assistance to Needy Families),
Supplemental Security Income, food
stamps, and housing and energy assis-
tance. Specifically, 22 percent of immi-
grant households receive some type of
assistance, compared with 15 percent of
native households.
8
This welfare gap arises from immi-
grant–native differences in family size,
education, age and gender of house-
hold head, and state of residence. When
these variables are taken into account,
the welfare gap falls from 7 to 2 per-
centage points. This difference in wel-
fare participation is not large enough 
to suggest that immigrants enter the
United States primarily to collect welfare
payments. The high labor force partici-
pation rates of the poorest immigrants
also suggest that this is not the case.
Working-age male Latin American immi-
grants participate in the labor force at a
rate of 94 percent, higher than the cor-
responding 91 percent rate for natives.
How Does Immigration Affect the
Social Security Trust Fund? While the
lower education levels of immigrants
make their fiscal impact negative, their
age distribution does the opposite. An
important fiscal benefit from immigrants
arises from the fact that they are rela-
tively young (Chart 8). Immigrants are
overrepresented in the age range 10–34.
The influx of younger people expands
the labor force and slows the ongoing
decline in the ratio of workers to re-
tirees. This, in turn, helps maintain the
solvency of pay-as-you-go retirement
programs, such as Social Security and
Medicare.
The Social Security Administration
has estimated the effects of changing
immigration levels on the Social Security
trust fund (Chart 9). Under the baseline
assumption that annual net migration is
900,000, the trust fund becomes insol-
vent in 2037, and an immediate payroll
tax increase of 1.89 percent would be
necessary to keep the fund solvent
until 2075. However, with annual net
immigration of 1,210,000, the trust fund
remains solvent until 2039 and the re-
quired tax increase falls to 1.75 per-
cent. Conversely, if annual net immi-
gration were only 655,000, insolvency
would be accelerated to 2036 and the
required tax increase would rise to 2.01
percent. This calculation understates
the positive effects of immigration, as it
does not account for the higher fertility
of immigrants and does not include
Medicare.
Current Policy
Our analysis has identified a number
of benefits from immigration as well as
some costs. What implications does our
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Actuary.analysis have for immigration policy?
Before addressing this question, it is
necessary to provide a brief description
of current policy.
Family Members Prioritized. U.S.
immigration policy at the time of the
First Great Migration was largely an
open door approach. World War I ush-
ered in an era of restricted labor
flows—a policy that has persisted to
the present. Initially, under the National
Origins Act of 1924, immigrants were
admitted under country quotas that
heavily favored Northern Europeans.
The Immigration Act of 1965, which is
the framework for current policy, abol-
ished national-origins quotas and based
entry on principles of family reunifi-
cation. Employment-related immigration
was given a very limited role. This law
was the catalyst for the Latin American
and Asian immigration now observed.
Since 1965 there have been several
modifications to existing policy. The
Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 granted a one-time amnesty to over
3 million undocumented residents. The
Immigration Act of 1990 increased em-
ployment visas to some extent. However,
employment immigration continues to be
much smaller than family immigration.
Current law limits employment-
related immigration to 140,000 each year,
while granting over 600,000 visas to
family members and other immigrants.
(See the box entitled “Current Immigra-
tion Limits.”) Moreover, about one-third
of the allotted employment visas go un-
used each year. Average annual admis-
sions in 1995–98 were only 93,000,
consisting of about 40,000 workers 
(and a few hundred investors) and over
50,000 spouses and minor children.
9
Why Do Employment-Related Per-
manent-Resident Visas Go Unused?
In a growing economy experiencing
record-low unemployment rates, it may
seem puzzling that all available em-
ployment visas are not used. Workers
admitted with employment visas repre-
sent only 6 percent of total immigration
in an average year. The stringent re-
quirements and restrictions on these
visas partly explain their limited use.
The law provides for five types of
visas (EB-1 through EB-5), allocated
under a variety of complex criteria.
Forty thousand are allotted to highly
skilled “priority workers” and do not re-
quire a job offer (EB-1). Another 80,000
visas go to workers with job offers: 
professionals with advanced degrees
(EB-2) or workers needed to fill labor
shortages (EB-3). Only 10,000 of the 
latter may be used for unskilled work-
ers. For visas requiring job offers, the
employer must comply with a labor 
certification process that requires an ex-
tensive search for domestic applicants.
The employer must interview all re-
spondents and submit a report on each
Page  6 Southwest Economy   May/June 2000
Current Immigration Limits
Current immigration law allows perma-
nent resident visas (green cards) for five
major categories of foreigners—immedi-
ate relatives of citizens, other family mem-
bers, “diversity” immigrants, refugees and
asylum seekers, and employment immi-
grants. Immigrants from any single coun-
try (excluding immediate relatives and
refugees) cannot comprise more than 7
percent of total immigration, a cap that 
natives of China, India, Mexico and the
Philippines currently reach.
All categories of admissions except
immediate relatives of citizens (defined as
their parents, spouses and minor children)
are subject to annual numerical limits:
226,000 for other family members, 55,000
for diversity immigrants, approximately
100,000 for refugees/asylum seekers, and
140,000 for employment immigrants. Un-
capped admissions of immediate relatives
averaged 283,000 per year in 1995–98.
Visas in each of the capped cate-
gories, except employment visas, are fully
exhausted each year. “Other family mem-
bers” experience waiting periods rang-
ing from 18 months (for unmarried adult
children of citizens) to over 11 years (for
siblings of citizens). Natives of China,
India, Mexico and the Philippines face
longer waiting periods because they have
reached the 7 percent country cap. The
longest wait is 20 years 11 months, for sib-
lings born in the Philippines.
Diversity immigrants and their families
are chosen in an annual mail-in lottery
(typically entered by more than 7 million
people) open to foreigners who have a
high school diploma or two years’ work 
experience. Because this program is in-
tended to diversify the immigrant stream,
most visas are reserved for natives of 
Europe and Africa—regions underrepre-
sented among recent U.S. immigrants.
Asylum and refugee admissions are set
each year by the president and are
granted to people facing persecution
abroad.
The Immigration Act





a very limited role.applicant to the state employment
agency.
10 Finally, two smaller visa pro-
grams have a quota of 10,000 visas each
(EB-4 and EB-5), of which about 7,000
and 1,000, respectively, are used. EB-4
visas are for religious and other special
workers, while EB-5 visas are granted to
investors with at least $1 million of cap-
ital who will create at least 10 U.S. jobs.
Although the law allows 40,000 EB-1
visas, the criteria are sufficiently strict
that average yearly admissions in
1995–98 were only 22,000. Similarly,
due to the labor certification require-
ment and other factors, only 15,000 of
the available 40,000 EB-2 visas per year
were issued in 1995–98. However,
47,000 EB-3 visas were issued, using up
all 40,000 visas allotted to that category
plus 7,000 of the unused EB-1 and 
EB-2 visas. Demand is particularly high
for the 10,000 EB-3 visas allotted for
low-skilled workers, who face about a
six-year waiting period for admission.
Also, despite the excess supply of EB-2
and skilled EB-3 visas, Chinese and 
Indian workers face waiting periods 
because they have reached the 7 per-
cent country limit discussed in the box.
H1-B and Other Temporary-Worker
Visas on the Rise. The difficulties associ-
ated with permanent-resident visas have
prompted employers to make greater
use of temporary-worker visas. Tempo-
rary visas are issued for a limited time
period and usually restrict the recipient
to working exclusively for the sponsor-
ing employer (perhaps another source
of their rising popularity among em-
ployers). In contrast to permanent resi-
dents, who can be naturalized after five
years in the United States, temporary-
visa holders are not eligible for citizen-
ship. They are also ineligible for most
government transfer programs.
There are a variety of temporary-
worker visas.
11 Most are occupation-
and skill-based, such as H1-B visas for
high-skilled workers in “specialty occu-
pations,” H2-A visas for seasonal farm-
workers and H2-B visas for other low-
skilled workers. Some of these, such as
the H2-A visas, require labor certifica-
tion by the employer as well as em-
ployer-provided housing and trans-
portation.
The H1-B visa program is the largest
and most prominent of the temporary-
visa programs. To qualify for an H1-B
visa, the worker generally must have 
at least a bachelor’s degree. The visa 
allows employment for three years and
can be renewed once. The visa does
not require labor certification; instead,
the employer simply files a labor-condi-
tion application certifying that the for-
eign worker will be paid the prevailing
market wage.
H1-B visa use has increased sharply
(Chart 10). An annual cap limiting H1-B
visas to 65,000 took effect in fiscal 1992.
Nonetheless, in 1998 the cap was reached
four months before the end of the fiscal
year. This prompted an October 1998
law raising the H1-B cap for three years:
to 115,000 for 1999 and 2000 and to
107,500 for 2001. In 2002, the cap re-
verts to 65,000. Interestingly, the higher
cap has been insufficient to meet the
demand by high-tech firms and other
employers such as universities and re-
search institutions. In fiscal 1999, the
cap was reached three months before
the end of the year, and, as shown in
the chart, the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service mistakenly issued almost
22,000 excess visas. The cap for this
year was reached in March, six months
before the end of the fiscal year.
The TN visa program for Mexican
and Canadian professionals is also
growing. Visas are issued to college-
educated applicants with job offers in
specified professions. Visas are issued
for one year at a time but can be re-
newed an unlimited number of times.
Although Canadian visas are unlimited,
Mexican visas are capped at 5,500 per
year through 2003. The application pro-
cess is simple, particularly for Canadi-
ans, who can often obtain visas at the
border in a matter of minutes. The TN
program has become one of the most
common methods for Canadian workers
to enter the United States.
Future Policy Options:
Where Will the Workers Come From?
As described above, current policy
gives little weight to employment-based
immigration. Yet the need for foreign
workers is higher than at any other time
in the post–World War II period. Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan re-
cently cited the nation’s labor shortage
as  “the greatest threat” to the record-
long economic expansion.
12 Immigrant
labor has been an integral part of the
economic boom. Should the United
States continue to turn to immigrants to
satisfy labor demand?
On balance, the benefits of immigra-
tion still outweigh the costs. Improve-
ment in policy can further these bene-
fits. For example, more employment-
based immigration would alleviate labor
market tightness and mitigate increases
in immigrant use of public services.
Simpler visa rules would increase the
use and effectiveness of job-based visas.
Short-Run Policy Options. Steps
toward more employment-based immi-
gration can be taken within the existing
policy framework. Possible steps include
raising the number of employment-based
visas and simplifying the rules for ob-
taining and keeping those visas. Several
proposals to achieve the first objective
are already being considered in Con-
gress. These include temporarily increas-
ing the number of H1-B visas, expand-
ing the H2-A and H2-B program, and
instituting a guest-worker program. Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Dallas President
Robert McTeer and Fed Chairman Green-
span have endorsed expansion of H1-B
visas.
13 Other possible changes include
abolishing the 10,000 limit on EB-3 visas
for unskilled workers and eliminating
the country cap that forces natives of
India and China to wait for EB-2 and
skilled EB-3 visas.
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the labor certification process for EB-2
and EB-3 visas. Similar changes could be
made in the temporary-visa programs.
Government-defined specialty worker re-
quirements exclude a majority of pro-
fessions. Under the current H1-B provi-
sions that require a college degree, the
equivalent of Microsoft founder Bill
Gates could not receive a visa. In the
New Economy, some skilled high-tech
workers leave school to pursue lucra-
tive entrepreneurial activities. U.S. firms
have experienced difficulty recruiting
these individuals under H1-B rules. The
H2-A visa program requires employers
to provide housing and transportation
for their seasonal workers, which deters
use of the program. Both temporary-visa
programs restrict the worker to one em-
ployer, a practice that has been criti-
cized as a form of indentured labor. A
better approach might be to let the mar-
ket determine which workers come here
and let foreign-born workers switch em-
ployers to ensure competitive wages.
What Are Some Long-Run Options?
Moving beyond the existing policy
framework, a more dramatic potential
reform would be to work toward a
common North American labor market.
Viable long-run policy should satisfy
labor demand at both the low and high
ends of the skill distribution. Although
greater political emphasis has been
placed on shortages in the high-tech
sector, three-fourths of all new jobs in
the coming decade will be in the ser-
vices and retail trade industries, contin-
uing the pattern of the past decade.
Currently, illegal immigration meets
the needs of employers where policy
falls short. Our NAFTA partners rank
high as source countries for illegal im-
migration—Mexico first and Canada
fourth. Skilled labor is plentiful in
Canada and unskilled labor is plentiful
in Mexico. Both types are coming to the
United States, legally and otherwise.
One possible response to this eco-
nomic reality is to integrate the three
labor pools into one common North
American labor market, as European
countries have done in the European
Union. Canadian and Mexican workers
with job offers could be admitted on
temporary, renewable visas. Like other
temporary workers, they would not be
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eligible for citizenship or most govern-
ment transfer payments. Extending TN
visas to lower skilled workers and re-
moving (or greatly increasing) the cap
for Mexican workers would be one way
to meet the U.S. economy’s labor needs
at all skill levels.
Summary
The United States is experiencing a
Second Great Migration, similar to the
first a century ago. Immigrant origins
have shifted as Latin America and Asia
have become primary sending areas.
This shift in origins has been accompa-
nied by an increase in the number of
low-skilled immigrants. Although upon
arrival these immigrants earn much less
than natives, their wages rise over time.
Interestingly, the United States contin-
ues to attract a disproportionate number
of skilled immigrants as well. The influx
of both types of workers has con-
tributed more than 25 percent of the in-
crease in the U.S. labor force over the
past two decades.
As new and different workers join
the labor force, economic gains arise
from the more efficient allocation of 
resources. Immigration allows native
workers to specialize in the goods they
can produce at lower cost, and con-
sumers receive their preferred goods
more cheaply. Native taxpayers also
gain from immigration, but only once
the contributions of the immigrants’ de-
scendants are included in the calcula-
tion. Moreover, the positive fiscal impact
of immigrants depends crucially on the
immigrant’s education level. Taxpayers
located near low-skilled immigrant clus-
ters will bear additional tax burdens as
a result. One important benefit at the
federal level, however, is the significant
positive effect immigrants have had on
the Social Security system.
Current immigration policy has many
shortcomings. Employment-based immi-
gration is very limited. Despite small
quotas, job-based visas are going un-
used, largely because of cumbersome
rules and other obstacles that prevent
their distribution. Although temporary-
worker visas, such as H1-B visas, have
eased the worker shortage somewhat
during the recent economic boom, there
is much room for reform in the policy
arena.
Consideration should be given to re-
shaping immigration policy to increase
job-based immigration. This would en-
sure that the economic expansion is not
curtailed by labor market shortages.
Short-run options include increasing
and simplifying the existing permanent
and temporary visa programs. A possi-
ble long-run option is to allow the free
exchange of workers with our NAFTA
partners, Canada and Mexico.
— Pia M. Orrenius
Alan D. Viard
Orrenius is an economist and Viard is a
senior economist and policy advisor in the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas.   Notes
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citizen permanent residents from receiving food stamps and cash wel-
fare, is not included in this analysis. Including it improves the average
fiscal impact by $8,000, according to New Americans, pp. 338–39.
8 Heaven’s Door, p. 111.
9 Employment-related permanent visas are discussed in more detail 
in Demetrios Papademetriou and Stephen Yale-Loehr (1996), Bal-
ancing Interests: Rethinking U.S. Selection of Skilled Immigrants
(Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace), pp. 37–48, and David Weissbrodt (1998), Immigration Law
and Procedure in a Nutshell (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co.),
pp. 119–21.
10 For a detailed description of the labor certification process and its
difficulties, see Balancing Interests: Rethinking U.S. Selection of
Skilled Immigrants, pp. 48–70, 102–13.
11 Temporary-worker visas are discussed in more detail in Balancing
Interests, pp. 70–99, and Immigration Law and Procedure, pp. 143–47.
12 Alan Greenspan, testimony before Senate Banking Committee, Feb-
ruary 23, 2000.
13 Robert McTeer, “How to Keep the Economy Growing,” Wall Street
Journal, May 20, 1999; Alan Greenspan, testimony before Senate
Banking Committee, February 23, 2000.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  9
HE CURRENT ECONOMIC ex-
pansion differs from its post–
World War II predecessors. First,
it has lasted longer, 110 months
and still counting (as of May
2000). Second, inflation has
drifted downward throughout the ex-
pansion, contrary to the usual pattern of
inflation rising as an expansion ages.
Moreover, even though unemployment
fell to around 4 percent in 1999 and
early 2000, inflation—at least as meas-
ured by the core inflation rate, which
excludes food and energy—has basi-
cally maintained its downward trajec-
tory (Chart 1).
In earlier decades, low unemploy-
ment was associated with rising wage
growth and rising inflation. During the
1990s, however, that connection seems
to have been broken. This article ex-
plores a variety of factors that may help
explain why the processes that generate
inflation have undergone a fundamental
shift during the 1990s.
I conclude that neither the unem-
ployment rate nor the monetary growth
rate can explain the declining inflation
rate during the 1990s. Rather, the miss-
ing pieces to the inflation puzzle are 
to be found in the synergies among (1)
immigration, (2) expanded trade and
globalization, (3) the explosion of private-
sector applications of new technologies,
(4) the beginning of a reduced scope
for government and (5) a quantum leap
in the availability of capital to busi-
nesses of all sizes.
The Phillips Curve
For over 35 years, economics text-
books have addressed the Phillips curve.
Back in the 1960s, the Phillips curve de-
picted an inverse relationship between
inflation (actually wage growth) and 
unemployment. The concept was fairly
simple: at low levels of unemployment,
workers would demand higher wages;
employers would capitulate but would
increase product prices to maintain profit
margins. In this world, lower unem-
ployment tended to be followed by, but
not necessarily cause, higher inflation.
This simplistic version of the Phillips
curve framework has been discredited
for a couple of decades, but belief in
this relationship persists. A best-selling
economics principles textbook deals
with the matter this way:
“In what sense, then, do policymakers
face a trade-off between inflation and
unemployment? The answer is that:
The cost of reducing unemployment
more rapidly by expansionary fiscal
and monetary policies is a perma-
nently higher inflation rate.”
1
Before the mid-1990s a casual glance
at the Phillips curve would have veri-
fied the previous quotation. The chang-
ing nature of the Phillips curve during
the 1990s was not apparent until 1996
or 1997 (Chart 2). Even with additional
data through the end of 1998, the author
of a leading intermediate macroeconom-
ics text suggests that the improved in-
T
THE1990SINFLATIONPUZZLE
A Commentary by Harvey Rosenblum
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Chart 2
The Phillips Curve Slopes Up in the ’90s
Inflation (percent)



















SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA tables; Bureau of Labor Statistics.flation performance of the 1990s was
due to temporary factors:
“Low unemployment still leads to
pressure on wages. The good inflation
performance of the 1990s appears to
be due more to an unusually slow in-
crease in nonwage costs and import
prices rather than to fundamental
changes in the labor market. It is
therefore reasonable to forecast that
the natural rate [of unemployment]
will not remain as low as it appears to
be in the late 1990s.”
2
More recently, Professor Brad DeLong
challenged the mind-set of those who
continue to believe in the Phillips curve:
“Thus perhaps the surprising thing is
not that the Phillips Curve-based fore-
casts of inflation have gone awry in
the past half decade. Perhaps the 
surprising thing is that the compli-
cated economic processes determin-
ing changes in inflation could be sum-
marized for so long by such a simple
relationship as the Phillips Curve. In
any event one thing is very clear: the
simple theory of the relation between
inflation and unemployment that
economists have peddled for a quar-
ter century no longer works.”
3
Given the economics profession’s
belief in the Phillips curve, at least in
the short run, it is worth examining 
the forces that changed the inflation–
unemployment relationship during the
1990s. What are these economic forces,
and, equally important, are they likely to
remain in place in the coming decade?
The answers are critical in the Fed’s
conduct of monetary policy. I now turn
to another single-factor view of inflation
that prevailed for many years.
Money as the Source of Inflation
Economists as far back as the 18th
century observed a correlation between
growth in the money supply—discov-
eries of gold and silver in those days—
and subsequent outbreaks of inflation.
Ultimately, this observation developed
into the Quantity Theory of Money,
which attempted to explain the rela-
tionship between money, prices and na-
tional income. Milton Friedman, winner
of the 1976 Nobel Prize for economics,
expressed the relationship succinctly:
“Inflation is always and everywhere a
monetary phenomenon.”
It was adherence to this belief that
induced then Federal Reserve Chairman
Paul A. Volcker and the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) on October
6, 1979, to abandon conducting mone-
tary policy by setting the federal funds
rate and to instead focus more directly
on controlling the growth rate of
money. In part because extreme vola-
tility of interest rates accompanied 
monetary targeting and in part because
inflation had become more muted, the
FOMC’s experiment with rigid mone-
tary control ended three years after it
began.
Although the inflation rate dropped
from double-digit levels in the late
1970s and early 1980s, it rarely fell
below the 3 percent to 4 percent range.
The Fed finally abandoned monetary
targeting altogether in mid-1993, follow-
ing several consecutive years of ex-
ceptionally weak monetary growth. The
FOMC announced its downgrading of
M2 and M1 as intermediate targets be-
cause it recognized, in the words of Fed
Chairman Alan Greenspan, “that the re-
lationship between spending and money
holdings was departing markedly from
historical norms.…The FOMC will con-
tinue to monitor the behavior of money-
supply measures for evidence about 
underlying economic and financial de-
velopments more generally, but it will
still have to base its assessments re-
garding appropriate policy actions on a
wide variety of economic indicators.”
4
In other words, in the Fed’s pursuit
of price stability, money growth matters,
but it matters a lot less than previously.
Other Influences on Inflation
If both the unemployment rate and
the money growth rate have lost their
systematic linkage with inflation, what
other factors influenced the disinflation-
ary outcome of the 1990s? Several cir-
cumstances stand out from prior
decades: (1) the surge in immigration;
(2) the acceleration of world trade, es-
pecially the impact of NAFTA; (3) the
spread of technology to the consumer
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than previously.and business sectors, as military and
other government programs subsided;
and (4) the increased availability of 
financial capital throughout the U.S.
economy. A more forward-looking mone-
tary policy that dealt quickly and pre-
emptively with inflation shocks may
have also contributed to these more 
favorable inflation results.
Immigration. The accompanying
article by Pia Orrenius and Alan Viard
details the demographic and labor force
impacts of the 1990s surge in immigra-
tion. By some estimates, at least one-
fourth and perhaps as much as one-
third of the labor force growth over the
past two decades was supplied by im-
migrants. Casual observation suggests
these proportions have risen in recent
years and might be even higher if un-
documented workers were accurately
counted.
5 This extra—seemingly endless
—supply of labor has likely reduced
worker demands for wage increases for
any given level of unemployment,
thereby muting the impact of the
Phillips curve relationship.
As long as U.S. wages are several-
fold greater than wages in countries
whose workers can cross into the
United States, legally or illegally, these
higher U.S. wages will attract such
workers like a magnet. In congressional
testimony earlier this year, Greenspan
cited the nation’s labor shortage as “the
greatest threat” to the economic expan-
sion. Clearly, immigration has mitigated
this threat and will continue to do so as
long as the U.S. immigration door re-
mains open. An economic expansion
without accelerating inflation requires,
among other things, an abundant labor
force.
In this context, consider an alterna-
tive to the traditional Phillips curve re-
lationship. During the 1990s (and espe-
cially after 1993), low rates of
unemployment were accompanied by
“Help Wanted” banners on restaurants,
hotels, retail establishments and other
businesses. Immigrants filled many of
these jobs. Immigrants add to the labor
supply and also increase aggregate de-
mand for goods and services in the
overall economy. This further stimulates
the demand for labor (native and immi-
grant) to produce the needed goods
and services. As immigrant workers re-
patriate some of their earnings to their
families in their country of origin, word
spreads about the availability of “good
jobs” in the United States. More immi-
grants follow, creating a different mix of
jobs, particularly a higher proportion of
low-skill, low-paying service-sector jobs
that would not even have existed if 
the immigration door had been locked.
Native workers gravitate toward the
medium and higher skilled jobs.
In this dynamic setting, demograph-
ics is not destiny. Low unemployment
does not drive up wages in excess of
productivity, nor does it produce infla-
tion that undermines an economic ex-
pansion. Rather, low unemployment 
induces an inflow of workers from
abroad, changes the skill mix of the
working-age population and feeds fur-
ther economic expansion. This hypoth-
esis is consistent with the evidence of
the 1990s and is advanced to stimulate
discussion and debate.
Technology, Trade and Globaliza-
tion. Two of the most common eco-
nomic anecdotes heard in Federal Re-
serve surveys of businesses in recent
years are (1) labor markets are tight and
(2) pricing power is virtually nonexis-
tent (that is, price increases are under-
cut by competitors). Thus, businesses
are searching the world for workers and
investing more in training the workers
they find. Freer trade, and the added
competitive pressures that accompany
it, spurred businesses to improve pro-
ductivity, thereby helping to keep infla-
tionary forces down (Chart 3).
When businesses have been unable
to bring workers to the job location, they
have sometimes managed to take the
job to the workers. Such “virtual immi-
gration” is made possible by the Inter-
net and other low-cost communications
technologies that have allowed informa-
tion-processing jobs—such as writing
software or processing credit card and
hospital bills—to be shipped to other
countries, including Ireland, India and
Mexico. This has increased the pool of
available labor beyond the conventional
measures of the domestic labor force.
Companies are taking advantage of
lower trade barriers to outsource pro-
duction to places throughout the world
where goods can be produced most
cheaply. As a result of NAFTA’s passage
in 1993, Mexico has become a source of
increased manufacturing capacity for
the United States. Trade (exports plus
imports) as a percentage of GDP has in-
creased fairly steadily since the late
1940s. This trend has accelerated some-
what during the 1990s as trade with
Canada and Mexico has become a
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  11
Chart 3
Productivity:
Back to the Good Old Days
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Table 1
Locus of Manufacturing Shifts to the Southwest
(State Rankings by Manufacturing Employment)
1985 1999
Rank State Rank State
1 California 1 California
2 New York 2 Maquiladoras
3 Ohio 3 Texas
4 Pennsylvania 4 Ohio
5 Texas 5 Illinois
10 Maquiladoras
NOTE: Maquila employment grew from 212,000 in 1985 to 1.1 million in 1999.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática.growing percentage of overall U.S.
trade following NAFTA’s passage.
One of the best-kept secrets in Wash-
ington, D.C., is that NAFTA is a success.
Mexico has become our second-largest
trading partner, with exports to Mexico
currently exceeding $100 billion annu-
ally. Because U.S. companies are shar-
ing production among their U.S., Cana-
dian and Mexican plants, the epicenter
of U.S. manufacturing has shifted from
the Northeast and Midwestern states to
the Southwest. If maquiladora manufac-
turing is thought of as a physical exten-
sion of Texas and California production,
the locus of manufacturing employment
has clearly shifted during the past 15
years (Table 1). Moving production to
its lowest cost location allows U.S. firms
to compete more effectively with for-
eign companies. This has permitted out-
put to grow while both unemployment
and inflation fall.
Access to Capital. The 1990s began
with a credit crunch in many parts of
the country. In the late 1980s, bank 
failures increased to post-Depression
highs, and many banks, as well as non-
bank lenders, had financial difficulties
that induced them to deny credit to
businesses. The situation began to im-
prove by 1993 as banks rebuilt their 
liquidity and capital positions. By the
late 1990s, it was a rarity to find busi-
nesses citing lack of access to credit.
Labor shortages, not capital shortages,
had become the issue of the day.
Equity capital availability has also im-
proved, especially for high-tech firms.
As the second stage of the bull market
took off in 1995 (Chart 4), so too did
the number of initial public stock offer-
ings by companies with short track
records and no experience of profitabil-
ity. Such easy access to low-cost capital
has spurred the growth of entirely new
industries or forms of delivering exist-
ing goods and services that would not
have been possible without such de-
mocratization of the capital markets.
This new capacity has added to com-
petitive pressures and reduced the pric-
ing power of incumbent firms. This has
forced business to increase productivity,
not prices.
Smaller Government. Two cross-
currents of fiscal policy trends have also
helped. In the aftermath of the Cold
War, military spending as a percent of
the nation’s GDP has been reduced
considerably, from over 5 percent down
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Chart 5
Cold War Ends
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Chart 6
Federal Budgets Shift from
Deficit to Surplus
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of Labor Statistics; author’s calculations.to about 3 percent (Chart 5). This has
freed up a sizable group of engineers,
scientists and production workers to
focus on the business and consumer
market instead of the military.
Second, government is playing a
smaller role in the economy. In addition
to increased deregulation and privatiza-
tion of some government services, the
federal government has been in budget
surplus since 1998 and the budget bal-
ance has been improving for eight con-
secutive years (Chart 6 ). The previous
government surplus was in 1969, and
the last back-to-back surpluses occurred
in 1956–57, when Elvis became king!
With less need to finance government
debt, the U.S. economy has found it
easier and cheaper to finance the capi-
tal needs of U.S. businesses.
6 The en-
suing investment boom, especially in
information technology and telecom-
munications equipment, has deepened
the stock of capital relative to labor.
Throughout the 1990s the U.S. econ-
omy has also benefited from increasing
flows of net foreign investment, the mir-
ror image of our trade deficit (Chart 7 ).
Without the foreign investment that
augmented our immigration-bolstered
labor force growth, it is doubtful the
U.S. economy would have been able 
to boost its capital-to-labor ratio suffi-
ciently to sustain the higher labor pro-
ductivity enjoyed in recent years. For-
eign capital and foreign labor are drawn
to the United States because their antici-
pated returns exceed those in other
countries. This combination of forces—
along with the increased ability to de-
velop technology that substitutes capital
for low-skilled labor—has supported
productivity growth, thereby keeping
inflationary forces in check. The 1990s
expansion is unusual in that productivity
accelerated after several years of eco-
nomic expansion, the opposite of what
typically occurs as a business expansion
ages beyond five years (Chart 8 ).
Sustainability
I have argued that the 1990s differed
from the ’70s and ’80s in that a conflu-
ence of factors—immigration, technol-
ogy, trade and globalization, smaller
government and capital market democ-
ratization—suppressed the forces of in-
flation. An important issue for monetary
policy is to what extent these factors
will prevail in the coming decade. The
answer depends in part on a few criti-
cal public policy choices to be made in
the near future, particularly regarding
trade and immigration.
Over the past year we have seen in-
creasing talk and modest action to open
the U.S. immigration door wider than 
it has been over the past couple of
decades and to more finely focus our im-
migration policy on the need for work-
ers. Concerted action on this front would
help keep inflation at bay and provide
other benefits enumerated in the accom-
panying article by Orrenius and Viard.
Freer trade with a wider range of
countries would increase market size
and strengthen competitive pressures to
enhance productivity. Businesses could
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  13
Chart 7
Capital Flows and Trade
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Chart 8
Productivity Growth
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By the late 1990s, 
it was a rarity to 
find businesses citing 
a lack of access to
credit. Labor shortages,
not capital shortages,
had become the issue 
of the day.then take greater advantage of the
economies of scale that are so prevalent
in networked products and industries or
in products with high fixed costs of de-
velopment, such as pharmaceuticals.
7
U.S. trade policy tends to be character-
ized by two steps forward, one step
back. We are now in the one-step-back
phase, with no fast track authority for
negotiating additional free trade agree-
ments. Perhaps the provision of perma-
nent normal trade relations with China
will shift the trade gears from reverse to
forward. Although we will reap the bene-
fits of NAFTA for many years to come,
we would enjoy greater growth and
lower inflation if NAFTA were supple-
mented by freer trade across the globe.
As shown in the Dallas Fed’s 1996 
annual report essay, “The Economy at
Light Speed,” there is no shortage of
new technologies waiting to be adapted
to the needs of business and consumers.
If anything, the inventory of innovative
technologies available for commercial
exploitation has grown since 1996.
The United States begins the 21st cen-
tury with a healthy banking and financial
system. In addition, the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999 will give the financial
services industry the necessary leeway to
adapt the appropriate corporate struc-
tures to respond to changing market and
competitive forces. This more flexible 
financial structure should assure that im-
provements in business access to finan-
cial capital will continue. If government
surpluses remain in place “as far as the
eye can see,” government’s reduced 
financing needs will continue to free up
capital resources for the private sector.
This combination of forces has the
potential to sustain the favorable low-
inflation environment that characterizes
the U.S. economy at the dawn of the
new century. Even in this favorable en-
vironment, monetary policy still matters.
These forces have reduced but not elimi-
nated inflation. The laws of supply and
demand have not been repealed. These
forces have augmented aggregate supply
and enabled it to keep pace with grow-
ing aggregate demand. The Fed must re-
main vigilant in maintaining this balance.
Given the long and variable lags with
which changes in monetary policy im-
pact the economy, and the reduced 
sensitivity of some economic sectors to
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higher interest rates, the Fed has been on
heightened alert for any reversal of these
positive supply-side forces that have re-
strained inflation in the 1990s. Factors
such as immigration, technology, global-
ization through freer trade, and more de-
mocratic capital markets are not easily
included in standard macroeconomic
models; nonetheless, Fed policymakers
are striving to better understand how
these pieces fit into the inflation puzzle.
Conclusion
To quote again from Brad DeLong:
“If economists are to be of any use, they
need to come up with a better—and in
all likelihood more sophisticated—
approach to understanding why infla-
tion rises.” This article has reviewed
several difficult-to-quantify variables
that contributed to, and are expected to
continue to support, lower inflation
than would be suggested by relation-
ships such as the Phillips curve or the
growth of traditional money supply meas-
ures. With concerted effort to extend
free trade beyond NAFTA, to expand
immigration based on the need to
alleviate worker and skills shortages,
and to continue to curtail the scope of
government’s role in the economy,
there is good reason to believe that
strong economic growth with low infla-
tion can continue in the years to come.
Rosenblum is senior vice president and
director of research at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas.   Notes
1 William J. Baumol and Alan S. Blinder, Macroeconomics: Principles
and Policy, 6th ed., 1994, Dryden Press, p. 395. Emphasis added.
2 Olivier Blanchard, Macroeconomics, 2nd ed., Prentice Hall, 1999, 
p. 161.
3 J. Bradford DeLong, “What Happened to the Phillips Curve?” New
York Times, March 9, 2000, p. C2.
4 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1994 Monetary
Policy Objectives, Washington, D.C., February 22, 1994, p. 18.
5 In the presence of widespread illegal immigration, the term “immi-
gration statistics,” by its very nature, borders on being an oxymoron.
6 There are exceptions to the smaller government story. For example,
federal tax revenues reached a 54-year high of 20.1 percent of GDP
in 1999. On the other hand, federal spending was 18.7 percent of
GDP, the lowest since 1974.
7 See W. Michael Cox and Richard Alm, “The New Paradigm,” 1999
Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2000, pp. 3–25.Further Information 
on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” ( Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s Internet web
site, www.dallasfed.org.
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HE TEXAS ECONOMY grew at a fast pace in the first
quarter, fueled by high oil prices and strong national
and international economies. Employment growth in
the first quarter was a brisk 3.6 percent annual rate,
with March surging to a 4.9 percent annual rate.
After reaching a 10-year high of $34 per barrel, oil
prices declined in April to a more sustainable level of around
$26 per barrel. These prices are boosting drilling budgets and
oil and gas activity in the region. Oil and gas extraction employ-
ment picked up, increasing at an annual rate of 6.4 percent in
March. The Texas rig count climbed to over 300 in April.
Construction employment grew 9.4 percent (annual rate)
through March, aided in part by the mild weather, although
growth decelerated throughout the quarter. Activity seems to
be concentrated in single-family housing, however.
T
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI† Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
3/00 127.2 128.2 144.9 548.2 1,084.3 1,552.3 5,995.9 9,325.6 1,894.0 740.9
2/00 126.8 128.2 144.4 546.8 1,083.6 1,544.8 5,966.3 9,285.9 1,890.2 738.3
1/00 125.7 128.2 144.4 543.2 1,083.2 1,543.2 5,949.5 9,263.5 1,886.4 738.0
12/99 126.5 128.2 144.0 537.4 1,081.1 1,535.8 5,942.8 9,241.1 1,895.6 734.1
11/99 124.6 128.2 143.9 535.4 1,081.1 1,532.3 5,919.5 9,212.2 1,896.5 734.5
10/99 124.3 127.5 144.3 533.5 1,081.8 1,529.9 5,902.6 9,192.1 1,892.9 734.0
9/99 123.4 126.7 144.4 532.1 1,080.5 1,535.1 5,891.6 9,183.7 1,889.7 734.1
8/99 123.9 126.7 144.0 526.5 1,081.1 1,532.1 5,879.5 9,163.2 1,886.4 733.4
7/99 124.2 126.3 143.5 527.0 1,083.3 1,514.7 5,864.2 9,132.7 1,889.5 729.4
6/99 124.2 125.2 144.4 525.6 1,080.8 1,534.0 5,845.8 9,130.6 1,885.4 729.3
5/99 123.3 125.9 145.3 520.9 1,082.1 1,533.7 5,820.2 9,102.2 1,883.9 728.4
4/99 123.7 125.5 147.3 524.6 1,084.5 1,532.6 5,810.4 9,099.4 1,888.1 729.1
* in thousands.
† Texas Industrial Production Index.
 
Manufacturing employment growth has been relatively flat.
Within manufacturing, the industrial machinery sector, which
includes computers, has seen very strong growth. Possibly
mirroring a slower construction industry, related manufactur-
ing sectors such as lumber, brick, furniture and fixtures have
lost employment in the first quarter.
The service-producing sector has been booming in 2000.
Especially strong were the distribution and business services
sectors. Trucking and warehousing employment grew at an
8.9 percent annual rate and business services at a 9.4 percent
rate in the first quarter.
Reflecting the strength of its trading partners, Texas exports
grew 9 percent in the fourth quarter of 1999 and exports to
Mexico were up 17 percent.
—Mine Yücel
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Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 1999 Annual Report
The technology revolution is rewriting the rules for how fast an economy
can grow without triggering high inflation.
The Dallas Fed’s 1999 Annual Report essay traces our current
economic success to Jack Kilby’s invention of the integrated circuit 
in 1958. This precursor to the microprocessor sparked invention and
innovation that turned traditional economic theories on end—and
produced the country’s largest and longest expansion ever.
You can access “The New Paradigm” on the Dallas Fed Web site,
www.dallasfed.org, by clicking on Publications and Annual
Reports. You may order a copy of the 1999 Annual Report by 
calling the Publications Service Desk at 214-922-5254 or 
800-333-4460, ext. 5254.